Antony Lewis: The basics of bitcoins and blockchains

Financial Markets and Portfolio Management -     

Ethnic discrimination in hiring,labour market tightness and the business cycle - evidence from field experiments

Several studies using observational data suggest that ethnic discrimination increases in downturns of the economy. We investigate whether ethnic discrimination depends on labour market tightness using data from correspondence studies. We utilize three correspondence studies of the Swedish labour market and two different measures of labour market tightness. These two measures produce qualitatively similar results, and, opposite to the observational studies, suggest that ethnic discrimination in hiring decreases in downturns of the economy.     

The impact of peer ratings on cooperation: The role of information and cost of rating

In this study, we experimentally analyze the effectiveness of payoff‐irrelevant peer‐to‐peer ratings as a cooperation enforcement device in a finitely repeated public goods game setting. We run two treatments that differ in the amount of information on own and others' received rating points provided to the players, whereas, in a third treatment, we analyze peer approval when assigning ratings to others is costly. In particular, we wonder whether, even under anonymity and in the absence of reputational concerns, (a) players rate others' contribution decisions in the expected direction and (b) the peer rating mechanisms under study foster cooperation and welfare. Our findings reveal that, in the two costless rating treatments, peer rating concerns lead to higher contributions and efficiency, compared to our control. Introducing a small fixed cost for assigning rating points results in a very high percentage of subjects deciding not to rate others' behavior, so that cooperation cannot be enforced.     

Codetermination,Price Competition and the Network Industry

This research develops a tractable two‐stage non‐cooperative game with complete information describing the behaviour of price‐setting firms that must choose to be profit maximisers or bargainers under codetermination in a network industry with horizontal product differentiation. The existing theoretical literature has already shown that codetermination might arise as the endogenous market outcome in a strategic competitive quantity‐setting duopoly. In sharp contrast with this result, the present article shows that codetermination does never emerge as a Nash equilibrium in a price‐setting non‐network duopoly. Then, it aims at highlighting the role of network externalities in determining changes of paradigm of the game and letting codetermination become a sub‐game perfect Nash equilibrium when prices are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. This equilibrium may be Pareto efficient. Results allow distinguishing between mandatory codetermination and voluntary codetermination. The article also proposes a model of endogenous codetermination according to which every firm may choose to bargain with its own corresponding union bargaining unit only whether the firm's bargaining strength is exactly the profit‐maximising one. The equilibrium outcomes emerging in this case range from a uniform Nash equilibrium, in which both firms are codetermined, to mixed Nash equilibria, in which only one of them chooses to be codetermined. These results are ‘network depending’ and do not hold in a non‐network duopoly.     

High exchange-rate volatility and low pass-through

Two specifications of an open-economy model are shown to generate high exchange-rate volatility and low exchange-rate pass-through (ERPT). In the model, price discrimination causes ERPT to be incomplete in both the short and the long run. In the short run, a small amount of nominal rigidities is enough to reduce ERPT sharply; still, exchange-rate depreciation worsens the terms of trade, consistent with the evidence. Possible biases from omitted variables and measurement error in the ERPT empirical literature (due to data limitations) are investigated using model-generated time series. Estimates of ERPT coefficients can be quite different from true parameters, and are sensitive to the shocks driving the economies. Estimates can nonetheless detect key structural features of the models.     

The pricing effect of certification on syndicated loans

To verify if a delegated monitor can certify its ability to perform its assigned tasks, we test whether syndicated loans in which a larger share of the facility is retained by the arranger have lower interest rates. For a large sample of syndicated loans in over 80 countries we find that this certification effect exists and is greater for facilities characterized by greater due diligence and monitoring efforts. Further, for listed companies the announcement effect of the new loan on the stock price is an increasing function of the portions of the loan retained by the arranger.     

A tale of minorities: evidence on religious ethics and entrepreneurship

Does Protestantism favour entrepreneurship more than Catholicism does? We provide a novel way to answer this question by comparing Protestant and Catholic minorities using Swiss census data. Exploiting the strong adhesion of religious minorities to their denomination’ ethical principles and the historical determination of the geographical distribution of denominations across Swiss cantons, we find that Protestantism is associated with a significantly higher propensity for entrepreneurship. The estimated difference ranges between 1.5 and 3.2 % points, it is larger the smaller the size of the religious minority, it is mainly driven by prime age male entrepreneurs and it stands up to a number of robustness checks. No effects are found when comparing religious majorities, suggesting that the implications of religious ethical norms on economic outcomes emerge only when such norms are fully internalized.     

US stock returns: are there seasons of excesses?

This article explores the existence of seasonality in the tails of stock returns. We use a parametric model to describe the returns, and obtain a proxy of the innovation distribution via a pre-processing model. Then, we develop a change-point algorithm capturing changes in the tails of the innovations. We confirm the good performance of the procedure through extensive Monte Carlo experiments. An empirical investigation using US stocks data shows that while the lower tail of the innovations is approximately constant over the year, the upper tail is larger in Winter than in Summer, in 9 out of 12 industries.